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assist the efforts of imperfect man, at all destroys human will. (Hear.) That it 

 interferes with it I will admit, in some sense, as a matter of course. Why, 

 otherwise, should it come at all ? But if it gives a man clearer knowledge, 

 stronger powers, higher aspirations, that man is responsible for all he has 

 so acquired. The doctrine of responsibility is grounded in our sense 

 of retribution for all wrong that is done. I will grant very freely with all 

 thankfulness to God, that in connexion with this doctrine of retribution, 

 there is a sense that mediation between us and the judgment that is due to 

 us is quite possible. A man does a wrong thing and fears the wrong he has 

 done, but, at the same time, no man has put himself in this position without 

 also having the feeling, that in some way or other some one will interfere. 

 This interference we have, as Christians, in the mediation of Christ. How- 

 ever, leaving this question of Calvinism and freedom of will and sense of 

 retribution, and hope of mediation and intervention, I should like to go back 

 for one moment to the beginning of the paper, and I promise that I will not 

 detain you more than a minute or two. It is a matter of common sense that 

 the ego precedes every action of every kind performed by a human being. 

 Action is not possible until there is an ego to act ; and here we see the very 

 blunder which pervades Mr. Herbert Spencer's philosophy. One is astounded 

 to find that the same blunder has penetrated the whole of the materialistic 

 mind of our age. They leave out the thought of this ego, which we are very 

 properly told by Mr. Spencer goes before the action. But he afterwards 

 tells us this ego is the result, or is identical with the circumstances in which 

 we find ourselves the feelings which arise within us. He quite forgets that 

 if there are feelings there must be an ego to feel. Whose feelings are they ? 

 They are the feelings of the ego of the man. And this leads me to object 

 in the strongest way to the manner in which Mr. Herbert Spencer, and al- 

 most all of us, are in the habit of using'popular abstract terms as though they 

 were entities. Men say they are moved by motives. I may contemplate a 

 certain thing and may consider it ; but the motive does not move me. It is 

 I who move in the whole matter. Men speak of their having a memory. I 

 have not one. I am thankful to say, I remember. (Hear, hear.) I have 

 legs, but I should not say they consist of walking and running : the walking 

 and running are actions of the limbs set in motion by the ego. In every way 

 we are injuring ourselves by abstract ideas. I do not deny that they are of 

 great usefulness ; as Berkeley pointed out, as instruments of thought they are 

 absolutely necessary. Some of them are but collective terms. When we 

 speak of a man , we use a word which is a general term, to describe what we 

 mean, whether a white, a red, or a black man. It is a general term to 

 describe the object we have in view. Every one knows what I mean in a 

 general way, if I say, " as I came to this room to-night I met a man." You 

 would not say I was speaking incorrectly if I did not describe how tall he 

 was, nor how he was dressed, nor what nation he was of, whether, for instance, 

 he was a Frenchman or a Dutchman. These general abstract terms are both 

 useful and necessary for the common purposes of the language. There is also 



