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them, and in doing this they act in opposition to their judgment and to 

 every good influence brought to bear upon them. Moreover, I would say it 

 is not only in opposition to reason and reflection, and to the laws of the 

 country, and without any sufficient inducement ; but men are also known to 

 assert their wills in opposition to the laws of God, which they acknowledge 

 and believe to be right and true. Men having full belief in the pains and 

 rewards of eternity, have, nevertheless, gone in entire opposition to that belief, 

 thereby proving that, universally, the will is absolutely free. (Hear.) Mr. 

 Herbert Spencer is spoken of as a man of philosophic grasp and of clear 

 scientific conception. All I wish to say is this, that if I were to take Mr. 

 Herbert Spencer's assertions as entitled to my fullest credence, I could not 

 believe in Christianity in other words, I hold that it requires more faith to 

 believe in Mr. Herbert Spencer, than to believe in Christianity. 



Mr. W. GRIFFITH. I think we are very much indebted to the author of 

 the paper for having proved false or erroneous some of the arguments of Mr. 

 Herbert Spencer. We need not refer to the Spencerian theory to understand the 

 necessitarian view. Whoever will look into the works of Hume and Priestley 

 will fully understand that line of thought. They asserted that the con- 

 nexion between motive and action is similar to that of cause and effect in 

 physics ; that human actions are the result, not of choice, and that they are 

 the sequences of physical causes, not the consequences of deliberate reason. 

 Even those who in theory contend for the doctrine of necessity, in practice 

 ignore it. Was Mr. Herbert Spencer a mere automaton when reading 

 previous philosophical authors ? Did he exercise no deliberation when he 

 composed his essays 1 And when he had selected a publisher to print and 

 circulate his opinions, were each and all of these processes the mere result of 

 a fortuitous concurrence of material atoms ? 



If we rightly define the word law, we shall be able to understand all 

 the fallacies which pervade the arguments of Mr. Spencer, and which 

 have been refuted by the author of this paper. Then it will not be 

 requisite to follow those arguments seriatim. How do we define what 

 we mean by the word " law " ? Is it a mere sequence of effect ? Is that 

 a true proposition ? Surely not. There are laws physical and laws 

 moral. The former must take effect ; the latter ought to be obeyed. 

 The latter, when defined according to the nature of things, suppose dis- 

 obedience possible, and postulate the freedom of the will. Most sound 

 writers on morals and jurisprudence will tell you that law is the expression 

 of the will of the law-giver enforced, by some sanction, upon the moral 

 being. If you once admit this definition of law the whole scheme of 

 Spencer falls to the ground, and needs no further exertion to destroy it. 

 But destruction is not construction. It is easy to criticise and find fault with 

 anything ; but we ought to consider what shall we substitute in its place. 



We have to establish, as a matter of fact, that the will is free. 

 The mere destruction of Mr. Spencer's theory by Mr. Ground hardly 

 establishes the positive side of the question. Dr. Irons appealed 



