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the transgression of that law, on the supposition that men and women, as a 

 rule, individually possess self-control and the power of choosing the good 

 and rejecting the evil ? Being a practising barrister, I know, we all know 

 what is frequently put forward as the defence of those who have broken the 

 law. When a criminal is put on his trial for a particular offence, how often 

 does he plead that he has committed it by accident or mistake or uninten- 

 tionally, that he had no guilty mind. And the defence of accident is 

 admitted. For instance, if a person, while defending his house against a 

 robber, shoots his own servant when he intends to shoot the burglar, he 

 is held not to be guilty of murder. He exercises his will in shooting, but 

 there is no vice in what he does. In doing what he had a legal right to do 

 he has unwittingly done what he did not mean to do. There is a defect in 

 the use of the will. Then, if you take the case of an infant ; he may be 

 put on his trial, but unless the understanding has been developed, "he," says 

 the law, " ought to be, as a matter of course, acquitted ; because he is not 

 held to be responsible until he has reached years of discretion." Again, take 

 the case of a lunatic ; he is acquitted on its being shown that there is a 

 defect of the understanding, and that he is not able rightly to exercise the 

 will. It is there held that there is no moral, or at least no legal, vice in the will. 

 All these instances go to prove that the administration of the law proceeds 

 on the supposition that there is freedom of the will, and that the accused is 

 punishable for its improper exercise. Again, we must recollect that this is 

 not merely the state of the law in England. The French laws proceed on 

 the same line ; so also do those of Germany and other European states. 

 In fact, the testimony of the whole civilised world shows that the freedom 

 of the will is looked upon a.s essential to guilt, and no one is punished unless 

 that freedom exists. I will but mention the testimony of conscience, and 

 the evidence derived from that. If we look to ourselves and remember what 

 have been our own failings in the past experiences of our lives, we shall, as 

 individuals, admit at once that we have had freedom to choose the right and 

 avoid the wrong. Passing to the second part of the subject, I must say that 

 to some extent I agree with Dr. Irons in his criticisms on the statements 

 that have been made respecting the theological and moral view of freedom 

 of will. I think it has been conclusively proved, not only that the 

 theory of Mr. Herbert Spencer is unstable, but also, as a matter of 

 fact, that freedom of will does exist, although it is true that great writers, 

 such as Augustine, have taken up the theological question, and have 

 somewhat obscured the doctrines of Christianity thereby. But Augustine 

 was not consistent. I think Mr. Ground is correct in saying that Augustine 

 asked how can there be guilt if there is no freedom of the will ? But at 

 another period of his life he wrote as if he looked on grace as irresistible, and 

 held that freedom of the will did not exist. But the question is,' 

 What is Christianity ? and not, What were the views of St. Augustine ? 

 We can recur to the original record, and we find St. Paul asserts 

 not only the supremacy of Divine grace, but also the freedom of the 



