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will. He tells us in the Epistle to the Philippians, ii. 12 and 13, that we 

 are to " work out our own salvation," and at the same time he says : 

 " It is God which worketh in you, both to will and to do of His good 

 pleasure." This single text illustrates in a remarkable way the complex 

 problem that may be raised as to the operations of the grace of God and the 

 freedom of the will at the same time. (Applause.) 



Mr. J. ENMORE JONES. It seems to me that Mr. Herbert Spencer has in 

 his mind only two facts psychical and physical, and that his argument is 

 grounded simply on these, which, in theological terms, we call the soul and 

 the body. He seems to have lost sight of one other element. Most, if not 

 all of us are often conscious of impulses and strength not our own, and we 

 come as Christians to the contemplation of the three great powers we are told 

 of by the Apostle body, soul, and spirit, it appears to me that this third 

 power is a power which is not recognised by Mr. Herbert Spencer. I think 

 that if this power were better defined, we should get rid of a great deal of 

 the difficulty which has hitherto helped to obscure the matter. I have 

 referred to this fact, so as to point out what I think has been very much 

 overlooked, namely, that this power which we call spirit, has been especially 

 created in us by the Deity and connected with the two other powers the 

 soul and body. The soul is, as Mr. Herbert Spencer says, attached to the 

 body, and intermingles and works with it in a mysterious way ; but I say 

 that these two are acted upon so as to produce visible effect, by the spirit, 

 which Mr. Herbert Spencer has not alluded to. 



Kev. F. N. OXENHAM. I suppose it will be admitted that in examining 

 any philosophical problem, if we are in search of the truth, we ought not to 

 allow any weight to supposed consequences. I mean that we should not 

 permit ourselves to be at all influenced towards rejecting or towards accepting 

 any theory, because it involves, or appears to involve, some consequence 

 which we object to, or which we welcome. This, I suppose, we should all 

 admit as a general rule. But, on the other hand, if a theory is put before 

 us which obviously carries with it the negation of any well-known and 

 indisputable truth, then we are justified in saying, " inasmuch as this theory 

 necessarily involves the denial of what we know to be true, we do not care 

 any further to inquire into it. It contradicts what is certainly true, and 

 therefore it must be false." Consequently, when we come across a theory 

 which is admitted to be contradicted by the evidence, not of one language 

 only, but of all languages, by the accordant evidence of all mankind in 

 every country and of every age, by the establishment of every civilised 

 government ever known (for all governments are constructed on the theory 

 that man is a responsible being, and can do, or abstain from doing such 

 things as are enjoined, or forbidden : the belief that this is so is evidenced 

 by every law that was ever made), when, I say, we come across a theory 

 thus irreconcilably at variance with the universal testimony of mankind, 

 we cannot justly be accused of prejudice if we put it aside, saying that 

 we do not care to inquire into it. It ig obviously false, being at variance 



