27 



with an undenied and undeniable truth. Now it seems to me that the 

 tendency of Mr. Herbert Spencer's argument is not to disprove the freedom 

 of the will, but simply to ignore that there is such a thing as will at all. 

 He is really arguing for the thesis, that our desires are not free : aud in 

 showing this, he appears to think that he has shown that our will is not free. 

 Our desires, he asserts, are the joint result of impulses over which we have 

 little or no command. He brings much evidence to show the truth of 

 this thesis, which we have no desire to question ; and then, having proved 

 this, he imagines that he has disposed of what he calls " the dogma of free 

 will." " The real proposition" he says, " involved in the dogma, of free 

 will is, that every one is at liberty to desire or not to desire." This is 

 a complete misconception. The question is not whether we are free to 

 desire or not to desire, but whether we are free to follow our desires or not 

 to follow them. Mr. Spencer's assumption that will is nothing more than 

 the result of those forces which produce natural desire, is an assumption not 

 only without evidence to support it, but in the teeth of evidence which denies 

 it. I cannot desire to be hanged, or shot, or suffocated, or to undergo any 

 great pain ; but I can will, I can choose to undergo any of these things. My 

 desire to do a thing or not to do it, may be, I admit, simply an effort of 

 nature beyond my control, the result of the joint action of various involuntary 

 impulses, as Mr. Herbert Spencer has very clearly denned it. We do not 

 quarrel with him for saying that our desires are the mere outcome of these 

 natural impulses ; but we do quarrel with him for assuming that our will 

 has the same origin and nothing more. And when he jumps to the conclu- 

 sion that the will is not free because the natural desires are not free, we are 

 compelled to pull him up, and to protest that such a conclusion is wholly 

 unwarrantable. It is, in short, simply ignoring that there is any such thing 

 as will. I shall not, however, dwell farther on this, as Dr. Irons has already 

 so clearly reminded us what is the true character of the will as one most im- 

 portant element in the ego : but I wished to call attention to the fact that Mr. 

 Spencer is not really arguing against the freedom" of the will ; he is arguing 

 against the freedom of the desires, and then assuming that the freedom of the 

 will is by the same arguments disproved. (Applause.) 



Rev. C. L. ENGSTROM. Thirteen or fourteen years ago, when I was reading 

 the Duke of Argyll's book, " The Eeign of Law," I saw what every one must 

 see who gives the subject sufficient consideration, that the mind is subject 

 to law as well as the body, and I think that unless we grasp this thought we 

 cannot understand Mr. Herbert Spencer's argument. Further, we are wrong, 

 I think, if we regard the (free) will as a separate originating force ; the 

 mistake seems to arise from the use of the word will in two entirely different 

 senses. A strong will really indicates a strong mental nature, especially in 

 regard to the desires, but free will is the ability to choose which of two or 

 more existing forces shall come into operation. A strong will is a magnificent 

 force directed by free will for good or for evil. The responsibility rests with 

 the free will, though the strong will, which is merely an instrument in its 



