OF NATURAL PHILOSOPHY. 139 



on the establishment and extension of classes 

 which have in them any thing artificial, as a basis 

 of a rigid nomenclature ; and especially how we 

 mistake the means for the end, and sacrifice conve- 

 nience and distinctness to a rage for arrangement. 

 Every nomenclature dependent on artificial classi- 

 fications is necessarily subject to fluctuations ; and 

 hardly any thing can counterbalance the evil of 

 disturbing well-established names, which have once 

 acquired a general circulation. In nature, one and 

 the same object makes a part of an infinite number 

 of different systems, an individual in an infinite 

 number of groups, some of greater, some of less 

 importance, according to the different points of view 

 in which they may be considered. Hence, as many 

 different systems of nomenclature may be ima- 

 gined as there can be discovered different heads of 

 classification, while yet it is highly desirable that 

 each object should be universally spoken of under 

 one name, if possible. Consequently, in all subjects 

 where comprehensive heads of classification do not 

 prominently offer themselves, all nomenclature must 

 be a balance of difficulties, and a good, short, un- 

 meaning name, which has once obtained a footing in 

 usage, is preferable to almost any other. 



(133.) There is nescience in which the evils re- 

 sulting from a rage for nomenclature have been felt 

 to such an extent as in mineralogy. The number 

 of simple minerals actually recognised by mineralo- 

 gists does not exceed a few hundreds, yet there 

 is scarcely one which has not four or five names 

 in different books. The consequence is most un- 

 happy. No name is suffered to endure long enough 



