COMPETITORS OF COTTON 



and hogs, the Government decided "to do something 

 for cotton." In Henry Wallace's "plough under" theory, 

 this meant a cut in cotton acreage. A short cotton crop 

 would mean a high price. Automatically, this would 

 raise the low farm-family income in the cotton states. 



That was how it was planned, but what actually hap- 

 pened was that every grower planted his best acres, 

 bought more fertilizer, cultivated harder. Though four 

 million fewer acres were planted, the yield per acre 

 jumped from one hundred and fifty-seven to two hun- 

 dred pounds. The crop increased three million bales; 

 the price slithered from nine and one-half cents to four 

 and three-fourths cents per pound. Instead of putting 

 the cotton grower out in the clear, the scarcity program 

 dropped cotton plumb to the bottom of the well. 



Since 1929 scores of schemes have been tried to sus- 

 tain the price of cotton: all sorts of production-control 

 programs by the Agricultural Adjustment Agency, and 

 sundry loans, purchases, and export bonuses by the 

 Commodity Credit Corporation. The price has been 

 shoved up to twenty-two cents a pound. The net result 

 has been to jockey American cotton into a position 

 where it must now fight a three-front war. 



World War II imposed a truce in cotton's war, but 

 postwar American cotton must again battle with the 

 low-cost foreign growths in world markets. In the home 

 market cotton must again compete with rayon, 

 Celanese, and nylon in fabrics and with paper in bags 



29 



