340 ADAPTIVENESS AND PURPOSIVENESS 



is hardly less effective purposelike behaviour in animals 

 with no nerve-ganglia at all. Our typical case, already 

 described, is the struggle between the brainless starfish and 

 the brainless sea-urchin. Here we have a long series of 

 difficult operations, not in the line of least resistance, not 

 habitual, not a sequence of tropisms or reflexes, but a cor- 

 related behaviour-chain. Can we avoid saying that the star- 

 fish shows endeavour? We do not dream of calling it pur- 

 poseful, but is it in any way purposive? We have to remem- 

 ber that the starfish has no nerve-ganglia. It has diffusely 

 scattered neurons, a line of them up each arm, and a pen- 

 tagon uniting these lines around the mouth. But there is 

 no concentration into ganglia, and therefore we must be very 

 parsimonious in our use of mental terms. We propose to 

 speak of this sort of purposelike behaviour as illustrating 

 organic purposiveness, organised endeavour. 



Summing up to this point, we find that a modicum of 

 purpose or intention is to be recognised over a very wide 

 range, that it is a vera causa that counts, that we are not at 

 liberty to take it or leave it, that it must enter into the 

 scientific description. It probably represents in all cases 

 an organismal summarising of past experiences in such a 

 way that a definite endeavour is engendered, and behaviour 

 is effectively dominated. But it tends to clearness to distin- 

 guish conceptual purposefulness in man's conduct, perceptual 

 purposefulness in the intelligent behaviour of man and some 

 animals, instinctive purposiveness in the routine behaviour 

 of ants and bees, and organic purposiveness in the controlled 

 and experimental endeavours of brainless animals, even 

 in the architectural achievements of the arenaceous 

 Foraminifera. 



We began with deliberate purposefulness and worked 



