THE PROBLEM OF BODY AND MIND 241 



though what we call physical objects and physical processes 

 are also real, they owe their reality to being conscious 

 processes or activities in disguise. We can formulate physi- 

 cal processes as if they consisted of the movements of bodies, 

 but our formulation is purely symbolic. There are no 

 things that move, nor things that have potential energy, 

 there are no individualities outside the conscious stream. 

 Things vanish away; things in themselves are regarded as 

 mental in their nature. Needless to say, students of science 

 are rarely attracted to this view. But it is to be suspected 

 that the provocation to antipathy is in part due to confusing 

 metaphysical and scientific language. 



(VI) Animism. Of all the theories of the psycho-phys- 

 ical relation the oldest and . perhaps the most attractive is 

 animism, the soul-theory. In its clearest form it maintains 

 the actuality of the soul as an embodied psychical being, 

 which realises itself in interaction with the bodily organism. 

 The soul is, apart from the bodily organisation, the ground 

 of the unity of consciousness; it makes sensation, meaning, 

 endeavour, and guidance possible. Its relation with the 

 body is reciprocal, for while it controls the body, the bodily 

 processes supply to it the content of consciousness. Inter- 

 acting with the body, it develops into the centre of personal- 

 ity. It may conceivably attain to an existence independent 

 of the life of its partner. 



On Bergson's view, the brain is the medium between 

 consciousness and the external conditions of life ; it is " the 

 organ of attention to life ", keeping the mind in contact with 

 reality. But thought, he maintains, is in great part in- 

 dependent of the brain, and "there is infinitely more in 

 a human consciousness than in the corresponding brain". 

 If the mental life thus transcends the cerebral life, if the 



