THE PROBLEM OF BODY AND MIND 249 



about has always been simultaneous progress in the expres- 

 sion of both aspects more intricate bodies with their 

 counterpart in subtler behaviour, a growing mentality and 

 its counterpart in a more complex brain-life. 



Objections to the Two-Aspect Theory. (1) It has been ob- 

 jected that the phrase " two aspects of the same process " is 

 unmeaning when forced upon the psycho-physical relation, 

 where we have to deal with sequences of radically different 

 orders, " apprehended in two radically different ways, the 

 one by sense-perception, the other by reflective introspection ". 

 Fechner spoke of the view of a sphere from the inside and 

 from the outside being two aspects of the same thing, but 

 in that case the one gives us the other, whereas we cannot 

 in the least degree deduce the nature of the psychical from 

 an observation of the physical, or contrariwise. But this 

 objection states a false case, for the postulate of the identity 

 hypotheses is that there never are two events, but always 

 only one. We must not think of two disparate series, one 

 teleological, implying a purposive selective unity, and the 

 other mechanical, due to the refined and complicated or- 

 ganisation of the nervous system; we must think of one 

 series fundamentally purposive and in its higher reaches 

 consciously purposeful. As Bain put it, " The line of 

 causal sequence is not mind causing body, and body causing 

 mind, but mind-body giving birth to mind-body." From a 

 very different starting-point Samuel Butler said almost the 

 same thing: "The idea of a soul, or of that unknown 

 something for which the word 'soul' is our hieroglyphic, 

 and the idea of living organism unite so spontaneously, and 

 stick together so inseparably, that no matter how often we 

 sunder them they will elude our vigilance and come together, 

 like true lovers, in spite of us." 



