DEFINITION AND PROVINCE OF LOGIC. 3 



Logic, then, comprises the science of reasoning, as well as 

 an art, founded on that science. But the word Reasoning, 

 again, like most other scientific terms in popular use, abounds 

 in ambiguities. In one of its acceptations, it means syllogizing ; 

 or the mode of inference which may be called (with sufficient 

 accuracy for the present purpose) concluding from generals to 

 particulars. In another of its senses, to reason is simply to 

 infer any assertion, from assertions already admitted : and in 

 this sense induction is as much entitled to be called reasoning 

 as the demonstrations of geometry. 



Writers on logic have generally preferred the former accep- 

 tation of the term : the latter, and more extensive significa- 

 tion is that in which I mean to use it. I do this by virtue of 

 the right I claim for every author, to give whatever provi- 

 sional definition he pleases of his own subject. But sufficient 

 reasons will, I believe, unfold themselves as we advance, why 

 this should be not only the provisional but the final definition. 

 It involves, at all events, no arbitrary change in the meaning 

 of the word ; for, with the general usage of the English lan- 

 guage, the wider signification, I believe, accords better than 

 the more restricted one. 



3. But Reasoning, even in the widest sense of which 

 the word is susceptible, does not seem to comprehend all that 

 is included, either in the best, or even in the most current, 

 conception of the scope and province of our science. The 

 employment of the word Logic to denote the theory of argu- 

 mentation, is derived from the Aristotelian, or, as they are 

 commonly termed, the scholastic, logicians. Yet even with 

 them, in their systematic treatises, argumentation was the 

 subject only of the third part: the two former treated of 

 Terms, and of Propositions ; under one or other of which heads 

 were also included Definition and Division. By some, indeed, 

 these previous topics were professedly introduced only on 

 account of their connexion with reasoning, and as a prepara- 

 tion for the doctrine and rules of the syllogism. Yet they 

 were treated with greater minuteness, and dwelt on at greater 

 length, than was required for that purpose alone. More recent 



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