CHAPTER III. 



OF THE THINGS DENOTED BY NAMES. 



1. LOOKING back now to the commencement of our 

 inquiry, let us attempt to measure how far it has advanced. 

 Logic, we found, is the Theory of Proof. But proof supposes 

 something provable, which must be a Proposition or Assertion ; 

 since nothing but a Proposition can be an object of belief, or 

 therefore of proof. A Proposition is, discourse which affirms 

 or denies something of some other thing. This is one step : 

 there must, it seems, be two things concerned in every act of 

 belief. But what are these Things ? They can be no other 

 than those signified by the two names, which being joined 

 together by a copula constitute the Proposition. If, therefore, 

 we knew what all names signify, we should know everything 

 which in the existing state of human knowledge, is capable either 

 of being made a subject of affirmation or denial, or of being 

 itself affirmed or denied of a subject. We have accordingly, 

 in the preceding chapter, reviewed the various kinds of Names, 

 in order to ascertain what is signified by each of them. And 

 we have now carried this survey far enough to be able to take 

 an account of its results, and to exhibit an enumeration of 

 all kinds of Things which are capable of being made predi- 

 cates, or of having anything predicated of them : after which 

 to determine the import of Predication, that is, of Proposi- 

 tions, can be no arduous task. 



The necessity of an enumeration of Existences, as the basis 

 of Logic, did not escape the attention of the schoolmen, and 

 of their master Aristotle, the most comprehensive, if not also 

 the most sagacious, of the ancient philosophers. The Cate- 

 gories, or Predicaments the former a Greek word, the latter 

 its literal translation in the Latin language were intended by 

 hirn and his followers as an enumeration of all things capable 

 VOL. i. 4 



