NAMES AND PROPOSITIONS. 



by a judge, in case a complaint were made to his tribunal of 

 the infringement of any of the legal obligations imposed by 

 the relation; and the acts which the judge would perform in 

 consequence ; acts being (as we have already seen) another 

 word for intentions followed by an effect, and that effect being 

 but another word for sensations, or some other feelings, occa- 

 sioned either to the agent himself or to somebody else. There 

 is no part of what the names expressive of the relation imply, 

 that is not resolvable into states of consciousness; outward 

 objects being, no doubt, supposed throughout as the causes by 

 which some of those states of consciousness are excited, and 

 minds as the subjects by which all of them are experienced, 

 but neither the external objects nor the minds making their 

 existence known otherwise than by the states of consciousness. 

 Cases of relation are not always so complicated as those to 

 which we last alluded. The simplest of all cases of relation 

 are those expressed by the words antecedent and consequent, 

 and by the word simultaneous. If we say, for instance, that 

 dawn preceded sunrise, the fact in which the two things, dawn 

 and sunrise, were jointly concerned, consisted only of the two 

 things themselves; no third thing entered into the fact or 

 phenomenon at all. Unless, indeed, we choose to call the suc- 

 cession of the two objects a third thing; but their succession 

 is not something added to the things themselves ; it is some- 

 thing involved in them. Dawn and sunrise announce them- 

 selves to our consciousness by two successive sensations. Our 

 consciousness of the succession of these sensations is not a third 

 sensation or feeling added to them ; we have not first the two 

 feelings, and then a feeling of their succession. To have two 

 feelings at all, implies having them either successively, or else 

 simultaneously. Sensations, or other feelings, being given, 

 succession and simultaneousness are the two conditions, to the 

 alternative of which they are subjected by the nature of our 

 faculties ; and no one has been able, or needs expect, to analyse 

 the matter any farther. 



11. In a somewhat similar position are two other sorts 

 of relations, Likeness and Unlikeness. I have two sensations; 



