112 NAMES AND PROPOSITIONS. 



we may affirm simple existence. 

 An unknown cause. In affirming, therefore, the existence of a 

 noumenon, we affirm causation. Here, therefore, are two addi- 

 tional kinds of fact, capable of being asserted in a proposition. 

 Besides the propositions which assert Sequence or Coexistence, 

 there are some which assert simple Existence ; and others assert 

 Causation, which, subject to the explanations which will follow 

 in the Third Book, must be considered provisionally as a dis- 

 tinct and peculiar kind of assertion. 



6. To these four kinds of matter-of-fact or assertion, 

 must be added a fifth, Besemblance. This was a species of 

 attribute which we found it impossible to analyse ; for which 

 no fundamentum, distinct from the objects themselves, could 

 be assigned. Besides propositions which assert a sequence or 

 co-existence between two phenomena, there are therefore also 

 propositions which assert resemblance between them : as, This 

 colour is like that colour; The heat of to-day is equal to the 

 heat of yesterday. It is true that such an assertion might 

 with some plausibility be brought within the description of 

 an affirmation of sequence, by considering it as an assertion 

 that the simultaneous contemplation of the two colours is 

 followed by a specific feeling termed the feeling of resemblance. 

 But there would be nothing gained by encumbering ourselves, 

 especially in this place, with a generalization which may be 

 looked upon as strained. Logic does not undertake to analyse 

 mental facts into their ultimate elements. Resemblance be- 

 tween two phenomena is more intelligible in itself than any 

 explanation could make it, and under any classification must 

 remain specifically distinct from the ordinary cases of sequence 

 and co-existence. 



It is sometimes said, that all propositions whatever, of which 

 the predicate is a general name, do, in point of fact, affirm or 

 deny resemblance. All such propositions affirm that a thing 

 belongs to a class ; but things being classed together accord- 

 ing to their resemblance, everything is of course classed with 

 the things which it is supposed to resemble most ; and thence, 

 it may be said, when we affirm that Gold is a metal, or that 



