CHAPTEK VIII. 



OF DEFINITION. 



1. ONE necessary part of the theory of Names and of 

 Propositions remains to be treated of in this place : the theory 

 of Definitions. As being the most important of the class of 

 propositions which we have characterized as purely verbal, 

 they have already received some notice in the chapter pre- 

 ceding the last. But their fuller treatment was at that time 

 postponed, because definition is so closely connected with clas- 

 sification, that, until the nature of the latter process is in some 

 measure understood, the former cannot be discussed to much 

 purpose. 



The simplest and most correct notion of a Definition is, a 

 proposition declaratory of the meaning of a word ; namely, 

 either the meaning which it bears in common acceptation, or 

 that which the speaker or writer, for the particular purposes of 

 his discourse, intends to annex to it. 



The definition of a word being the proposition which 

 enunciates its meaning, words which have no meaning are 

 unsusceptible of definition. Proper names, therefore, cannot 

 be defined. A proper name being a mere mark put upon an 

 individual, and of which it is the characteristic property to be 

 destitute of meaning, its meaning cannot of course be de- 

 clared ; though we may indicate by language, as we might 

 indicate still more conveniently by pointing with the finger, 

 upon what individual that particular mark has been, or is 

 intended to be, put. It is no definition of " John Thomson " 

 to say he is " the son of General Thomson ;" for the name 

 John Thomson does not express this. Neither is it any 

 definition of " John Thomson " to say he is " the man now 

 crossing the street." These propositions may serve to make 

 known who is the particular man to whom the name belongs, 

 but that may be done still more unambiguously by pointing to 



