INFERENCE IN GENERAL. 183 



Of Induction, therefore, we shall say no more at present, 

 than that it at least is, without doubt, a process of real infer- 

 ence. The conclusion in an induction embraces more than is 

 contained in the premises. The principle or law collected 

 from particular instances, the general proposition in which we 

 embody the result of our experience, covers a much larger 

 extent of ground than the individual experiments which form 

 its basis. A principle ascertained by experience, is more than 

 a mere summing up of what has been specifically observed in 

 the individual cases which have been examined ; it is a gene- 

 ralization grounded on those cases, and expressive of our belief, 

 that what we there found true is true in an indefinite number 

 of cases which we have not examined, and are never likely to 

 examine. The nature and grounds of this inference, and the 

 conditions necessary to make it legitimate, will be the subject 

 of discussion in the Third Book : but that such inference 

 really takes place is not susceptible of question. In every in- 

 duction we proceed from truths which we knew, to truths which 

 we did not know ; from facts certified by observation, to facts 

 which we have not observed, and even to facts not capable of 

 being now observed ; future facts, for example ; but which we 

 do not hesitate to believe on the sole evidence of the induction 

 itself. 



Induction, then, is a real process of Reasoning or Inference. 

 Whether, and in what sense, as much can be said of the Syl- 

 logism, remains to be determined by the examination into which 

 we are about to enter. 



