366 



INDUCTION. 



antecedents ; and we have, philosophically speaking; no right 

 to give the name of cause to one of them, exclusively of the 

 others. What, in the case we have supposed, disguises the 

 incorrectness of the expression, is this : that the various con- 

 ditions, except the single one of eating the food, were not 

 events (that is, instantaneous changes, or successions of instan- 

 taneous changes) but states, possessing more or less of per- 

 manency ; and might therefore have preceded the effect by 

 an indefinite length of duration, for want of the event which 

 was requisite to complete the required concurrence of con- 

 ditions : while as soon as that event, eating the food, occurs, 

 no other cause is waited for, but the effect begins imme- 

 diately to take place : and hence the appearance is presented 

 of a more immediate and close connexion between the effect 

 and that one antecedent, than between the effect and the 

 remaining conditions. But though we may think proper to 

 give the name of cause to that one condition, the fulfilment 

 of which completes the tale, and brings about the effect with- 

 out further delay ; this condition has really no closer relation 

 to the effect than any of the other conditions has. The pro- 

 duction of the consequent required that they should all exist 

 immediately previous, though not that they should all begin 

 to exist immediately previous. The statement of the cause is 

 incomplete, unless in some shape or other we introduce all the 

 conditions. A man takes mercury, goes out of doors, and 

 catches cold. We say, perhaps, that the cause of his taking 

 cold was exposure to the air. It is clear, however, that his 

 having taken mercury may have been a necessary condition of 

 catching cold ; and though it might consist with usage to say 

 that the cause of his attack was exposure to the air, to be 

 accurate we ought to say that the cause was exposure to the 

 air while under the effect of mercury. 



If we do not, when aiming at accuracy, enumerate all the 

 conditions, it is only because some of them will in most cases 

 be understood without being expressed, or because for the 

 purpose in view they may without detriment be overlooked. 

 For example, when we say, the cause of a man's death was 



