380 INDUCTION. 



M. Comte, limit the sphere of scientific investigation to Laws 

 of Phenomena, and speak of the inquiry into causes as vain 

 and futile. The causes which M. Comte designates as inac- 

 cessible, are efficient causes. The investigation of physical, 

 as opposed to efficient, causes (including the study of all the 

 active forces in Nature, considered as facts of observation) is 

 as important a part of M. Comte's conception of science as of 

 Dr. Whewell's. His objection to the word cause is a mere 

 matter of nomenclature, in which, as a matter of nomenclature, 

 I consider him to be entirely wrong. " Those," it is justly 

 remarked by Mr. Bailey,* "who, like M. Comte, object to 

 designate events as causes, are objecting without any real 

 ground to a mere but extremely convenient generalization, to 

 a very useful common name, the employment of which in- 

 volves, or needs involve, no particular theory." To which it 

 may be added, that by rejecting this form of expression, 

 M. Comte leaves himself without any term for marking a 

 distinction which, however incorrectly expressed, is not only 

 real, but is one of the fundamental distinctions in science; 

 indeed it is on this alone, as we shall hereafter find, that the 

 possibility rests of framing a rigorous Canon of Induction. 

 And as things left without a name are apt to be forgotten, a 

 Canon of that description is not one of the many benefits 

 which the philosophy of Induction has received from M. 

 Comte's great powers. 



6. Does a cause always stand with its effect in the 

 relation of antecedent and consequent ? Do we not often say 

 of two simultaneous facts that they are cause and effect as 

 when we say that fire is the cause of warmth, the sun and 

 moisture the cause of vegetation, and the like ? Since a cause 

 does not necessarily perish because its effect has been pro- 

 duced, the two things do very generally coexist ; and there 

 are some appearances, and some common expressions, seeming 

 to imply not only that causes may, but that they must, be 

 contemporaneous with their effects. Cessante causa cessat et 



* Letters on the Philosophy of the Human Mind, First Series, p. 219. 



