CONTENTS. IX 



CHAPTER II. Of Abstraction, or the Formation of 



1. The comparison which is a'preliminary to induction implies 



geueral conceptions ..... 193 



2. but these need not be pre-existent . . . 194 



3. A general conception, originally the result of a comparison, 



becomes itself the type of comparison . . . 198 



4. What is meant by appropriate conceptions . . 200 



5. and by clear conceptions . . . . 203 



6. Further illustration of the subject . . . 205 



CHAPTER III. Of Naming, as subsidiary to Induction. 



1. The fundamental property of names as an instrument of 



thought . . '. . . ... 209 



2. Names are not indispensable to induction . . 210 



3. In what manner subservient to it . . . . 211 



4. General names not a mere contrivance to economize the 



use of language . . . . . .213 



CHAPTER IV. Of the Requisites of a Philosophical Lan- 

 guage, and the Principles of Dejmition. 



1. ]?irst requisite of philosophical language, a steady and 



determinate meaning for every general name . . 215 



2. Names in common use have often a loose connotation . 215 



3. which the logician should fix, with as little alteration 



as possible . : . . . . . 218 



4. Why definition is often a question not of words but of 



things . " . . . . . . 220 



5. How the logician should deal with the transitive applica- 



tions of words . . '. . . . 224 



6. Evil consequences of casting off any portion of the cus- 



tomary connotation of words .... 229 



