CHAPTER XX. 



OF ANALOGY. 



I. THE word Analogy, as the name of a mode of 

 reasoning, is generally taken for some kind of argument sup- 

 posed to be of an inductive nature, but not amounting to a 

 complete induction. There is no word, however, which is used 

 more loosely, or in a greater variety of senses, than Analogy. 

 It sometimes stands for arguments which may be examples of 

 the most rigorous Induction. Archbishop Whately, for in- 

 stance, following Ferguson and other writers, defines Analogy 

 conformably to its primitive acceptation, that which was given 

 to it by mathematicians, Resemblance of Relations. In this 

 sense, when a country which has sent out colonies is termed 

 the mother country, the expression is analogical, signifying 

 that the colonies of a country stand in the same relation to 

 her in which children stand to their parents. And if any 

 inference be drawn from this resemblance of relations, as, for 

 instance, that obedience or affection is due from colonies to 

 the mother country, this is called reasoning by analogy. Or 

 if it be argued that a nation is most beneficially governed by 

 an assembly elected by the people, from the admitted fact 

 that other associations for a common purpose, such as joint- 

 stock companies, are best managed by a committee chosen by 

 the parties interested ; this, too, is an argument from analogy 

 in the preceding sense, because its foundation is, not that a 

 nation is like a joint stock company, or Parliament like a 

 board of directors, but that Parliament stands in the same 

 relation to the nation in which a board of directors stands to 

 a joint stock company. Now, in an argument of this nature, 

 there is no inherent inferiority of conclusiveness. Like other 

 arguments from resemblance, it may amount to nothing, or it 

 may be a perfect and conclusive induction. The circumstance 



