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INDUCTION. 



ence of which can he a subject of logical induction, hecause 

 the only things of which the existence in individual cases can 

 he a subject of experience. 



It is true that a thing is said hy us to exist, even when it 

 is absent, and therefore is not and cannot he perceived. But 

 even then, its existence is to us only another word for our con- 

 viction that we should perceive it on a certain supposition ; 

 namely, if we were in the needful circumstances of time and 

 place, and endowed with the needful perfection of organs. My 

 belief that the Emperor of China exists, is simply my belief 

 that if I were transported to the imperial palace or some other 

 locality in Pekin, I should see him. My belief that Julius 

 Csesar existed, is my belief that I should have seen him if I 

 had been present in the field of Pharsalia, or in the senate- 

 house at Rome. When I believe that stars exist beyond the 

 utmost range of my vision, though assisted by the most 

 powerful telescopes yet invented, my belief, philosophically 

 expressed, is, that with still better telescopes, if such existed, 

 I could see them, or that they may be perceived by beings less 

 remote from them in space, or whose capacities of perception 

 are superior to mine. 



The existence, therefore, of a phenomenon, is but another 

 word for its being perceived, or for the inferred possibility of 

 perceiving it. When the phenomenon is within the range of 

 present observation, by present observation we assure our- 

 selves of its existence ; when it is beyond that range, and is 

 therefore said to be absent, we infer its existence from marks 

 or evidences. But what can these evidences be ? Other 

 phenomena; ascertained by induction to he connected with 

 the given phenomenon, either in the way of succession or of 

 coexistence. The simple existence, therefore, of an indivi- 

 dual phenomenon, when not directly perceived, is inferred from 

 some inductive law of succession or coexistence : and is con- 

 sequently not amenable to any peculiar inductive principles. 

 We prove the existence of a thing, by proving that it is 

 connected by succession or coexistence with some known 

 thing. 



With respect to general propositions of this class, that is, 



