CHAPTER VI. 



THE PRINCIPLES OF A PHILOSOPHICAL LANGUAGE 

 FURTHER CONSIDERED. 



1. WE have, thus far, considered only one of the re- 

 quisites of a language adapted for the investigation of truth ; 

 that its terms shall each of them convey a determinate and 

 unmistakeable meaning. There are, however, as we have 

 already remarked, other requisites ; some of them important 

 only in the second degree, but one which is fundamental, and 

 barely yields in point of importance, if it yields at all, to the 

 quality which we have already discussed at so much length. 

 That the language may be fitted for its purposes, not only 

 should every word perfectly express its meaning, but there 

 should be no important meaning without its word. What- 

 ever we have occasion to think of often, and for scientific 

 purposes, ought to have a name appropriated to it. 



This requisite of philosophical language may be con- 

 sidered under three different heads ; that number of separate 

 conditions being involved in it. 



2. First : there ought to be all such names, as are 

 needful for making such a record of individual observations 

 that the words of the record shall exactly show what fact it is 

 which has been observed. In other words, there should be 

 an accurate Descriptive Terminology. 



The only things which we can observe directly being our 

 own sensations, or other feelings, a complete descriptive 

 language would be one in which there should be a name for 

 every variety of elementary sensation or feeling. Combina- 

 tions of sensations or feelings may always be described, if 

 we have a name for each of the elementary feelings which 

 compose them ; but brevity of description, and clearness 



