322 FALLACIES. 



be inherent in all things which exist, or which are said to he 

 one, were enough to put an end to all intelligible discussion ; 

 especially since, with a just perception that the truths which 

 philosophy pursues are general truths, it was soon laid down 

 that these general substances were the only subjects of science, 

 being immutable, while individual substances cognizable by 

 the senses, being in a perpetual flux, could not be the subject 

 of real knowledge. This misapprehension of the import of 

 general language constitutes Mysticism, a word so much 

 oftener written and spoken than understood. Whether in the 

 Vedas, in the Platonists, or in the Hegelians, mysticism is 

 neither more nor less than ascribing objective existence to the 

 subjective creations of our own faculties, to ideas or feelings of 

 the mind ; and believing that by watching and contemplating 

 these ideas of its own making, it can read in them what takes 

 place in the world without. 



5. Proceeding with the enumeration of a priori falla- 

 cies, and endeavouring to arrange them with as much reference 

 as possible to their natural affinities, we come to another, 

 which is also nearly allied to the fallacy preceding the last, 

 standing in the same relation to one variety of it as the fallacy 

 last mentioned does to the other. This, too, represents nature 

 as under incapacities corresponding to those of our intellect ; 

 but instead of only asserting that nature cannot do a thing 

 because we cannot conceive it done, goes the still greater 

 length of averring that nature does a particular thing, on the 

 sole ground that we can see no reason why she should not. 

 Absurd as this seems when so plainly stated, it is a received 

 principle among scientific authorities for demonstrating a priori 

 the laws of physical phenomena. A phenomenon must follow 

 a certain law, because we see no reason why it should deviate 

 from that law in one way rather than in another. This is 

 called the Principle of the Sufficient Keason ;* and by means 

 of it philosophers often flatter themselves that they are able 



* Not that of Leibnitz, but the principle commonly appealed to under that 

 name by mathematicians. 



