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FALLACIES. 



done, but in all probability not until some one had again 

 been found with the qualities of Columbus or Newton. 

 Because any one great man might have had his place supplied 

 by other great men, the argument concludes that all great 

 men could have been dispensed with. The term " great 

 men" is distributive in the premises and collective in the 

 conclusion. 



" Such also is the fallacy which probably operates on most 

 adventurers in lotteries ; e.g. ' the gaining of a high prize is 

 no uncommon occurrence ; and what is no uncommon occur- 

 rence may reasonably be expected ; therefore the gaining of a 

 high prize may reasonably be expected :' the conclusion when 

 applied to the individual (as in practice it is) must be under- 

 stood in the sense of ' reasonably expected by a certain indi- 

 vidual;' therefore for the major premise to be true, the middle 

 term must be understood to mean, ' no uncommon occurrence 

 to some one particular person ;' whereas for the minor (which 

 has been placed first) to be true, you must understand it of 

 ' no uncommon occurrence to some one or other / and thus you 

 will have the Fallacy of Composition. 



" This is a Fallacy with which men are extremely apt to 

 deceive themselves; for when a multitude of particulars are 

 presented to the mind, many are too weak or too indolent to 

 take a comprehensive view of them, but confine their attention 

 to each single point, by turns ; and then decide, infer, and act, 

 accordingly : e. g. the imprudent spendthrift, finding that he is 

 able to afford this, or that, or the other expense, forgets that 

 all of them together will ruin him." The debauchee destroys 

 his health by successive acts of intemperance, because no one 

 of those acts would be of itself sufficient to do him any serious 

 harm. A sick person reasons with himself, " one, and another, 

 and another, of my symptoms, do not prove that I have a fatal 

 disease ;" and practically concludes that all taken together do 

 not prove it. 



2. We have now sufficiently exemplified one of the 

 principal Genera in this Order of Fallacies ; where, the source 

 of error being the ambiguity of terms, the premises are ver- 



