434 LOGIC OF THE MORAL SCIENCES. 



which preceded the thoughts : one of those states recals the 

 other, each being attended, in its passage, by the particular 

 state of consciousness which is consequent on It. On this 

 theory the uniformities of succession among states of mind 

 would be mere derivative uniformities, resulting from the laws 

 of succession of the bodily states which cause them. There 

 would be no original mental laws, no Laws of Mind in the 

 sense in which I use the term, at all : and mental science 

 would be a mere branch, though the highest and most recon- 

 dite branch, of the science of physiology. M. Comte, accord- 

 ingly, claims the scientific cognizance of moral and intellec- 

 tual phenomena exclusively for physiologists ; and not only 

 denies to Psychology, or Mental Philosophy properly so called, 

 the character of a science, but places it, in the chimerical 

 nature of its objects and pretensions, almost on a par with 

 astrology. 



But, after all has been said which can be said, it remains 

 incontestible that there exist uniformities of succession among 

 states of mind, and that these can be ascertained by observa- 

 tion and experiment. Further, that every mental state has a 

 nervous state for its immediate antecedent and proximate 

 cause, though extremely probable, cannot hitherto be said to 

 be proved, in the conclusive manner in which this can be 

 proved of sensations ; and even were it certain, yet every one 

 must admit that we are wholly ignorant of the characteristics 

 of these nervous states ; we know not, and at present have no 

 means of knowing, in what respect one of them differs from 

 another ; and our only mode of studying their successions or 

 coexistences must be by observing the successions and co- 

 existences of the mental states, of which they are supposed to 

 be the generators or causes. The successions, therefore, which 

 obtain among mental phenomena, do not admit of being de- 

 duced from the physiological laws of our nervous organization : 

 and all real knowledge of them must continue, for a long time 

 at least, if not always, to be sought in the direct study, by ob- 

 servation and experiment, of the mental successions themselves. 

 Since therefore the order of our mental phenomena must be 

 studied in those phenomena, and not inferred from the laws of 



