Philosophic Evolution. 169 



to expend our religious instincts, an entity without intel- 

 ligence or volition, without an affection or a purpose, 

 as much the cause of everything vile as of all we most 

 admire an entity to be saluted only by exclamations 

 (vocal or mental) of "It is! It is!" 



Then we have the " universum " of Strauss, the con- 

 tempt of Schopenhauer for which was so great a sin in 

 the eyes of the former, seeing that Strauss demanded for 

 his idol (what from no sane man will he ever get) a 

 devotion such as a good man feels for his God ! 



A more naturally popular, but really as absurd an idol 

 is that "humanity" of M. Comte, so curtly dismissed 

 by Mr. Spencer* as a quite inadequate object of reverence, 

 which a little reflection readily enough shows it to be. 

 Small value can ever be widely set on the " immor- 

 tality " which positivism promises to its faithful disciples, 

 and for the following reasons : i. Few persons will care 

 for a popularity which follows upon their utter personal 

 annihilation. 2. Few, again, can hope for such immor- 

 tality at all, since the immense majority of men must 

 be content to die unknown. 3. Still fewer, it may be 

 affirmed, would really prize posthumous veneration by 



about this " Unknowable." Thus we learn from Professor Tyndall 

 ("Use and Limit of the Imagination in Science") that it is known 

 to have what may be compared with " shores," and further than 

 these " shores of the unknowable " are known to be " infinite." 

 * " Study of Sociology," p. 311. 



