172 Contemporary Evolution. 



sensibles through association with felt sensibles ; but 

 rational-judgment is, at the least, the taking up and trans- 

 formation of this sensible association by the action of a 

 self-conscious intellect. Mr. Lewes* speaks of bees 

 feeling geometry in constructing their cells. They feel, 

 of course ; but to imply they have thereby any appre- 

 ciation of geometry would be hardly less unreasonable 

 than to imply the same of crystallising salt or sugar. 

 The " logic " of sense is truly " logic," but it is the logic 

 of some one else, not of the brute that feels. Mr. Lewes, 

 however, makes a remark of so strange a character, that 

 it is impossible after reading it not to hesitate before 

 accepting any opinion of his respecting intellect. Speak- 

 ing f of " instinct " as being, according to his strange 

 notion, " lapsed or indiscursive intelligence/' he says : 

 " The objection will doubtless be raised that instinct is 

 wholly destitute of the characteristic of intelligence in that 

 it has no choice : its operation is fixed, fatal. The reply 

 is twofold : in the first place, the objection, so far as it 

 has validity, applies equally to judgment where, given 

 the premisses, the conclusion is fatal, no alternative being 

 open. Axioms, in this sense, are logical instincts. Thus 

 the highest intellectual process is on a level with this 

 process said to be its opposite." " On a level ! " 

 " applies equally ! " Why, here the essential distinction 



* " Problems of Life and Mind," p. 240. 

 f Op. cit, p. 141. 



