CHAP. XIII. 



foolishness of this kind of reasoning will not really be exaggerated 

 if it is represented by an argument such as the following patently 

 fallacious one : " A cat is an entity, a dream is an entity, therefore 

 a cat is a dream."* 



* This folly is well pointed out by the 

 late G. H. Lewes, in the second chapter 

 of the second problem of his third series 

 of Problems of Life and Mind. ' He says : 

 ' ' Psychologico-metaphysical speculation, 

 untrammelled by the distinctions of sen- 

 sible experience, easily arrives at Pan- 

 psychism. The hypothesis rests upon 

 an arbitrary extension of terms, arid upon 

 an exclusive selection of one order of 

 conceptions. By a sufficient elasticity 

 of terms we may easily reduce all diver- 

 sities to identity ; all things are alike if 

 you disregard their points of imlikeness. 

 . . . Stretching terms, it is easy to 

 identify life with molecular change, and 

 then conclude all things to be living. 

 But the biologist must protest against 

 such manipulating of conceptions. For 

 him life expresses a vast class of pheno- 

 mena, never found except in definite 

 groups of substances, undergoing definite 

 kinds of molecular change. The crystal 

 is not alive, because it does not assimi- 

 late, reproduce itself, and die. . . . Any 

 one choosing to stretch terms may say 

 that molecules live because molecules 

 exist. But in that case we shall have to 

 create a new term for the mode of exist- 

 ence, which is now called life. . . . 

 Playing such tricks with language, we 

 may ask : Why should not a lamp-post 

 feel and think, since it is subject to 

 molecular changes consequent on im- 

 pression ? "Why should not a crystal 

 calculate ? Does not oxygen yearn after 

 hydrogen ? Has not hydrogen the pro- 

 perty of humidity ? These questions 

 seem absurd, yet they are only naked 

 presentations of what some philosophers 

 have clothed in technical terms, and 

 their readers have accepted with con- 

 fidence. . . . And why this reliance on 

 the law of Continuity ? That law is 

 simply a deduction from the conception 

 of Quantity, abstracted from Quality by 

 mathematical artifice ; it is one abstract 

 idea of existence irrespective of all con- 

 crete modes of existence. It has its uses ; 

 but note, first, that it is an ideal construc- 

 tion, not a real transcription ; secondly, 

 that not only is it an ideal construction, 

 which once formed becomes a necessity 

 of thought, although it is detached from 

 and contradictory of real experiences, it 

 is also in the very nature of the case only 

 applicable to abstract existence ; and not 

 to concrete modes of existence. See how 

 these considerations nullify the applica- 



tion of the law to the gradations and 

 diversities of organic phenomena. If 

 Continuity is a necessity of thought, 

 not less imperiously is Discontinuity a 

 necessity of experience, given in every 

 qualitative difference. The manifold of 

 sense is not to be gainsaid by a specu- 

 lative resolution of all diversities into 

 gradations. Experience knows sharply- 

 defined differences, which make gaps 

 between things. Speculation may ima- 

 gine these gaps filled, some unbroken 

 continuity of existence linking all things. 

 It must imagine this, because it cannot 

 imagine the non-existence coming between 

 discrete existences. . . . Turning from 

 the metaphysical to the biological con- 

 sideration, it is plain that the charac- 

 teristic phenomena observed in organisms 

 are not observed in anorganisms ; and 

 even in cases where a superficial appear- 

 ance seems to imply an identity, an in- 

 vestigation of the conditions shows this 

 not to be so. The actions of a machine 

 often resemble certain actions of an 

 organism. But when we come to under- 

 stand how both are produced, we under- 

 stand how the products are really very 

 different. We deny that a crystal has 

 sensibility ; we deny it on the ground 

 that crystals exhibit no more signs of 

 sensibility than plants exhibit signs of 

 civilization ; and we deny it on the 

 ground that among the conditions of 

 sensibility there are some positively 

 known by us, and these are demonstrably 

 absent from the crystal. It is in vain to 

 say sensibility depends on molecular 

 change, therefore all molecular change 

 must in some degree be sentient change ; 

 we have full evidence that it is only 

 special kinds of molecular change that 

 exhibit the special signs called sentient ; 

 we have as good evidence that only 

 special aggregations of molecules are 

 vital, and that sensibility never appears 

 except in living organisms, disappearing 

 with the vital activities, as we have that 

 banks and trades' unions are specifically 

 human institutions. On the first head ; 

 that of evidence, we must therefore pro- 

 nounce against the hypothesis of pan- 

 psychism. How about its philosophic 

 advantages ? To some minds eager for 

 unity, and above all charmed by certain 

 poetic vistas of a cosmos no longer 

 alienated from man, the hypothesis has 

 attractions. But while its acceptance 

 would introduce great confusion into our 



