IX.] EVOLUTION AND ETHICS. 235 



2. That it could not have developed that high esteem 

 for acts of care and tenderness to the aged and infirm 

 which actually exists, but would rather have perpetuated 

 certain low social conditions which obtain amongst certain 

 savage tribes. 



3. That it could not have evolved from ape sensations 

 the noble virtue of a Marcus Aurelius, or the loving but 

 manly devotion of a St. Lewis. 



4. That, alone, it could not have given rise to the maxim 

 fiat justitia, mat ccelum. 



5. That the interval between material and formal mo- 

 rality is one altogether beyond its power to traverse. 



Also, that the anticipatory character of moral principles 

 is a fatal bar to that explanation of their origin which is 

 offered to us by Mr. Herbert Spencer. And, finally, that 

 the solution of that origin proposed recently by Sir John 

 Lubbock is a mere version of simple utilitarianism, appeal- 

 ing to the pleasure or safety of the individual, and there- 

 fore utterly incapable of solving the riddle it endeavours 

 to explain. 



Such appearing to be the case as to the power of 

 " Natural Selection," we nevertheless find moral concep- 

 tions formally moral ideas not only spread over the 

 civilized world, but manifesting themselves unmistakably 

 (in however rudimentary a condition, and however mis- 

 applied) amongst the lowest and most degraded of savages. 

 If from amongst these, individuals can be brought forward 

 who seem to be destitute of any moral conception, similar 

 cases also may easily be found in highly civilized commu- 

 nities. Such cases tell no more against moral intuitions 

 than do cases of colour-blindness or idiotism tell against 

 sight and reason. We have then, in distinct moral per- 



