288 THE GENESIS OF SPECIES. [CHAP. 



degree), or, on the other hand, in terms decidedly inferior, 

 such as those are driven to who think of Him, yet decline 

 to accept as a help the term " personality ; " there can be 

 no question but that the first conception is immeasurably 

 nearer the truth than the second. Yet the latter is the one 

 put forward and advocated by that author in spite of its 

 unreasonableness, and in spite also of its conflicting with 

 the whole moral nature of man and all his noblest aspira- 

 tions. 1 



Again, Mr. Herbert Spencer objects to the conception of 

 God as " first cause," on the ground that " when our sym- 

 bolic conceptions are such that no cumulative or indirect 

 processes of thought can enable us to ascertain that there 

 are corresponding actualities, nor any predictions be made 

 whose fulfilment can prove this, then they are altogether 

 vicious and illusive, and in no way distinguishable from 

 pure fictions." * 



1 In an excellent article on " Variety as an Aim in Nature," in the 

 Number of the Contemporary Review for May 1871, the Duke of Argyll 

 remarks : "If there be any work in Nature which reflects any image of the 

 'Creator, the human mind is that work. Nor is there any difficulty in con- 

 ceiving how such an image may be true and yet be faint how it may be real 

 and yet be distant. For nothing in the human mind is more wonderful than 

 this, that it is conscious of its own limitations. The bars which we feel so 

 much, and against which we so often beat in vain, are bars which would 

 not be felt at all unless there were something in us against which they 

 press. It is as if these bars were a limit of Opportunity rather than a 

 boundary of Power. It is as if we might understand immensely more than 

 we can discover if only some one would explain it to us ! There is hardly 

 one of the higher powers or faculties of our mind in respect of which we do 

 not feel daily that we are tied and bound by the weight of our infirmities. 

 Therefore we can have no difficulty in conceiving all our own powers 

 exalted to an indefinite degree. And thus it is that although all goodness, 

 and power, and knowledge, must be conceived of as we know them in our- 

 selves, it does not follow that they must be conceived of according to the 

 measure which we ourselves supply." 2 i,uc. cit. \. 29. 





