XII.] THEOLOGY AND EVOLUTION. 289 



Now, it is quite true that " symbolic conceptions," which 

 are not to be justified either (1) by presentations of sense, 

 or (2) by intuitions, are invalid as representations of real 

 truth. Yet the conception of God referred to is justified 

 by our primary intuitions, and we can assure ourselves 

 that it does stand for an actuality by comparing it with 

 (1) our intuitions of free-will and causation, and (2) our 

 intuitions of morality and responsibility. That we have 

 these intuitions is a point on which the author joins issue 

 with Mr. Spencer, and confidently affirms that they cannot 

 logically be denied without at the same time complete and 

 absolute scepticism resulting from such denial scepticism 

 wherein vanishes any certainty as to the existence both of 

 Mr. Spencer and his critic, and by which it is equally im- 

 possible to have a thought free from doubt, or to go so far 

 as to affirm the existence of that very doubt or of the 

 doubter who doubts it. 



It may not be amiss here to protest against the intoler- 

 able assumption of men of a certain school, who are con- 

 tinually talking in lofty terms of " science," but who 

 actually speak of primary religious conceptions as " un- 

 scientific," and habitually employ the word " science " 

 when they should limit it by the prefix " physical." This 

 is the more amazing as not a few of this school adopt the 

 idealist philosophy, and affirm that " matter and force " are 

 but names for certain " modes of consciousness." It might 

 be expected of them at least to admit that opinions 

 which repose on primary and fundamental intuitions are 

 especially and par excellence scientific. 



The foregoing are some of the objections to the Christian 

 conception of God. We may now turn to those which are 

 directed against God as the Creator, i.e. as the absolute origi- 



