XII.] THEOLOGY AND EVOLUTION. 313 



ence of a thing that we cannot determine the exact moment 

 of its first manifestation. When watching "dissolving 

 views," who can tell, whilst closely observing the gradual 

 changes, exactly at what moment a new picture, say St. 

 Mark's, Venice, can be said to have commenced its mani- 

 festation, or have begun to dominate a preceding represen- 

 tation of " Dotheboys' Hall " ? That, however, is no reason 

 for denying the complete difference between the two pic- 

 tures and the ideas they respectively embody. ' 



The notion of a special nature, a peculiar innate power 

 and activity, what the scholastics called a "substantial 

 form," will be distasteful to many. The objection to the 

 notion seems, however, to be a futile one, for it is abso- 

 lutely impossible to altogether avoid such a conception and 

 such an assumption. If we refuse it to the individuals 

 which embody the species, we must admit it as regards 

 their component parts nay, even if we accept the hypo- 

 thesis of pangenesis, we are nevertheless compelled to 

 attribute to each gemmule that peculiar power of repro- 

 ducing its own nature (its own " substantial form "), with 

 its special activity, and that remarkable power of annexing 

 itself to certain other well-defined gemmules the nature of 

 which is also to plant themselves in a certain definite 

 vicinity. So that in each individual, instead of one such 

 peculiar power and activity dominating and controlling all 

 the parts, you have an infinity of separate powers and 

 activities limited to the several minute component gem- 

 mules. 



It is possible that in some minds the notion may lurk 

 that such powers are simpler and easier to understand, 

 because the bodies they affect are so minute ! This 

 absurdity hardly bears stating. We can easily conceive 



