IX.] EVOLUTION AND ETHICS. 209 



It must be recollected that in consenting to worship 

 this unholy God, Mr. Mill is not asked to do harm to his 

 neighbor, so that his refusal reposes simply on his percep- 

 tion of the immorality of the requisition. It is also note- 

 worthy that an omnipotent Deity is supposed incapable of 

 altering Mr. Mill's mind and moral perceptions. 



Mr. Mill's decision is right, but it is difficult indeed to 

 see how, without the recognition of an " absolute morality," 

 he can justify so utter and final an abandonment of all util- 

 ity in favor of a clear and distinct moral perception. 



These two ideas, the " right " and the " useful," being 

 so distinct here and now, a greater difficulty meets us with 

 regard to their origin from some common source, than met 

 us before when considering the first beginnings of certain 

 bodily structures. For the distinction between the " right " 

 and the " useful " is so fundamental and essential that not 

 only does the idea of benefit not enter into the idea of duty, 

 but we see that the very fact of an act not being beneficial 

 to us makes it the more praiseworthy, while gain tends to 

 diminish the merit of an action. Yet this idea, "right," 

 thus excluding, as it does, all reference to utility or pleas- 

 ure, has nevertheless to be constructed and evolved from 

 utility and pleasure, and ultimately from pleasurable sensa- 

 tions, if we are to accept pure Darwinianism : if we are to 

 accept, that is, the evolution of man's psychical nature and 

 highest powers by the exclusive action of " Natural Selec- 

 tion," from such faculties as are possessed by brutes ; in other 

 words, if we are to believe that the conceptions of the high- 

 est human morality arose through minute and fortuitous 

 variations of brutal desires and appetites in all conceivable 

 directions. 



It is here contended, on the other hand, that no conser- 

 vation of any such variations could ever have given rise to 

 the faintest beginning of any such moral perceptions ; that 

 by "Natural Selection" alone the maxim fiat justitia, mat 



