84 BACON 



guished from primary philosophy, and natural theology, we 

 must note, that as physics regards the things which are wholly 

 immersed in matter and movable, so metaphysics regards what 

 is more abstracted and fixed ; that physics supposes only exist- 

 ence, motion, and natural necessity, whilst metaphysics sup- 

 poses also mind and idea. But to be more express : as we have 

 divided natural philosophy into the investigation of causes, and 

 the production of effects, and referred the investigation of 

 causes to theory, which we again divide into physical and meta- 

 physical ; it is necessary that the real difference of these two 

 be drawn from the nature of the causes they inquire into ; and 

 therefore, plainly, physics inquires into the efficient and the 

 matter, and metaphysics into the form and the end. Physics, 

 therefore, is vague and unstable as to causes, and treats mov- 

 able bodies as its subjects, without discovering a constancy of 

 causes in different subjects. Thus the same fire gives hardness 

 to clay and softness to wax, though it be no constant cause 

 either of hardness or softness. 



" Limus ut hie durescit, et hsec ut cera liquescit 

 Uno eodemque igni." Virgil.* 



We divide physics into three parts ; for nature is either col- 

 lected into one total, or diffused and distributed. Nature is 

 directed in its collocations either by the common elements in 

 the diversity of things, or by the unity which prevails in the one 

 integral fabric of the universe. Whence this union of nature 

 produces two parts of physics ; the one relating to the principles 

 of things, and the other to the structure of the universe ; whilst 

 the third exhibits all the possible varieties and lesser collections 

 of things. And this latter is like a first gloss, or paraphrase in 

 the interpretation of nature. None of the three are deficient 

 entirely, but how justly and solidly they have been treated is 

 another question. 



The third part we again divide into two others, with regard 

 to concretes and abstracts, or into physics of creatures and 

 physics of natures: the one inquiring into substances, and all 

 the variety of their accidents ; the other into accidents through 

 all the variety of substances. Thus, if inquiry be made about a 

 lion or an oak; these support many different accidents: so if 

 the inquiry were about heat or gravity ; these are found in many 

 different substances. But as all physics lies in the middle, be- 



