154 BACON 



thing fixed and immovable, upon which, as a firm basis, to rest 

 in its inquiries. And as Aristotle endeavors to prove that, in 

 all motion of bodies, there is something still at rest, and elegant- 

 ly explains the ancient fable of Atlas, sustaining the heavens on 

 his shoulders, of the poles of the world, about which the revo- 

 lutions are performed :a so men have a strong desire to retain 

 within themselves an atlas, or pole for their thoughts, in some 

 measure to govern the fluctuations and revolutions of the 

 understanding, as otherwise fearing their heaven should tum- 

 ble. And hence it is, that they have been ever hasty in laying 

 the principles of the sciences, about which all the variety of dis- 

 putes might turn without danger of falling ; not at all regard- 

 ing, that whoever too hastily catches at certainties shall end in 

 doubts, as he who seasonably withholds his judgment shall ar- 

 rive at certainties. 



It is therefore manifest that this art of judging by syllogism 

 is nothing more than a reduction of propositions to their prin- 

 ciples by middle terms. But principles are supposed to be re- 

 ceived by consent, and exempt from question, whilst the inven- 

 tion of middle terms is freely permitted to the subtilty and in- 

 vestigation of the wit. This reduction is of two kinds, direct 

 and inverse. It is direct when the proposition itself is reduced 

 to the principle, and this is called ostensive proof : it is inverse 

 when the contradictory of the proposition is reduced to the 

 contradictory of the principle, which they call proof by ab- 

 surdity : but the number or scale of the middle term is dimin- 

 ished, or increased, according to the remoteness of the pro- 

 position from the principle. 



Upon this foundation we divide the art of judgment nearly, 

 as usual, into analytics, and the doctrine of clenches, or confuta- 

 tions ; the first whereof supplies direction, and the other cau- 

 tion : for analytics directs the true forms of the consequences 

 of arguments, from which, if we vary, we make a wrong con- 

 clusion. And this itself contains a kind of clench, or confuta- 

 tion ; for what is right shows not only itself, but also what is 

 wrong. Yet it is safest to employ clenches as monitors, the 

 easier to discover fallacies, which would otherwise ensnare the 

 judgment. We find no deficiency in analytics ; for it is rather 

 loaded with superfluities than deficient.^ 



We divide the doctrine of confutations into three parts ; vir., 

 I. The confutation of sophisms ; 2. The confutation of interpre- 



