ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING 229 



two seasons be principally observed: the one when the mind 

 is best, and the other when it is worst disposed for business ; 

 that by the former, the greater despatch may be made ; and by 

 the latter, the obstructions of the mind may be borne down with 

 a strenuous application ; whence the intermediate times slide 

 away the more easily and agreeably. 



The third example shall be the precept which Aristotle tran- 

 siently mentions; viz., to endeavor our utmost against that 

 whereto we are strongly impelled by nature ; thus, as it were, 

 rowing against the stream, or bending a crooked stick the con- 

 trary way, in order to bring it straights 



A fourth precept may be founded on this sure principle, that 

 the mind is easier, and more agreeably drawn on to those things 

 which are not principally intended by the operator, but con- 

 quered or obtained without premeditated design, because our 

 nature is such, as in a manner hates to be commanded. There 

 are many other useful precepts for the regulating of custom ; 

 and if custom be prudently and skilfully introduced, it really 

 becomes a second nature ; but if unskilfully and casually treated, 

 it will be but the ape of nature, and imitate nothing to the life, 

 or awkwardly, and with deformity. 



So, with regard to books, studies, and influence over our 

 manners, there are numerous useful rules and directions. One 

 of the fathers, in great severity, called poetry the devil's wine ; 

 as indeed it begets many temptations, desires, and vain opin- 

 ions. And it is a very prudent saying of Aristotle, deserving 

 to be well considered, that " young men are improper hearers 

 of moral philosophy,"/* because the heat of their passions is not 

 yet allayed and tempered by time and experience. And, to say 

 the truth, the reason why the excellent writings and moral dis- 

 courses of the ancients have so little effect upon our lives and 

 manners, seems to be, that they are not usually read by men 

 of ripe age and judgment, but wholly left to unexperienced 

 youths and children. And are not young men much less fit 

 for politics than for ethics, before they are well seasoned with 

 religion, and the doctrines of morality and civility ? For be- 

 ing, perhaps, depraved and corrupted in their judgment, they 

 are apt to think that moral differences are not real and solid ; 

 but that all things are to be measured by utility and success. 

 Thus the poet said, "Successful villainy is called virtu. 

 " Prosperum et felix scelus, virtus vocatur."tf And again, " Ille 



