The History of Things 75 



was right, in the second place, because in the sci- 

 entific interpretation of any particular occurrence 

 in inanimate nature, we have no reason to believe 

 that mechanical categories are not quite sufficient. 

 To conclude, however, that this scientific interpre- 

 tation is in terms of concepts which are self-ex- 

 planatory, or that it is the only interpretation, or 

 that it is in itself a satisfying human interpreta- 

 tion, is quite another matter. 



Recoil from the Scientific Position. The scien- 

 tific conception of the physical universe as a sort 

 of world-egg developing of itself, capable in 

 virtue of the properties resident in it of passing 

 from phase to phase in the course of seons, like 

 a machine wound up not only to go but to improve 

 itself by going, is repugnant to many minds, and 

 various attempts have been made to wriggle away 

 from it. Fundamentally, perhaps, this recoil is 

 due to a misunderstanding of the aim of science, 

 a failure to see that a descriptive account of oc- 

 currences is not an explanation of them, and cannot 

 be put in opposition to other quite incommensu- 

 rable ways of summing up the history. But let us 

 consider for a moment how some have tried to put 

 a brake on the impetuously driven chariot of 

 science. 



(1) It is useful to point out that many of the 

 riddles of inanimate nature are still unsolved, for 

 nothing is more prejudicial to progress than giving 



