Man's Place in Nature 215 



ments in favor of the theory that the moral senti- 

 ments have arisen in the same way as other natural 

 phenomena, by a process of evolution, Huxley said, 

 "but as immoral sentiments have no less been 

 evolved, there is, so far, as much natural sanction 

 for the one as the other. The thief and the 

 murderer follow nature just as much as the philan- 

 thropist." "Cosmic evolution may teach us how 

 the good and evil tendencies of man may have 

 come about; but, in itself, it is incompetent to 

 furnish any better reason, 1 why what we call good 

 is preferable to what we call evil, than we had be- 

 fore." 



Is this really so ? On the contrary, it seems that 



1 It is difficult to understand what Huxley meant by 

 "better reason." We must first ask whether the study of 

 cosmic evolution furnishes any reason why well-doing ia 

 preferable to ill-doing. It is not to be expected that it 

 will furnish any more convincing reason than the study of 

 human history furnishes. Without raising any deep 

 questions we may surely agree that good conduct in man 

 is that which, on the whole, makes for evolution for 

 progress along the line indicated by the ascent of man, 

 that it makes for health, clear minds, fulness and freedom 

 of life, a happier and more harmonious society, and so on. 

 It is thus in a line with that kind of doing which among 

 animals has persisted, and is the opposite of that kind of 

 doing which, as it crops up in Protean guise, is subjected 

 to elimination, or, in the case of parasites, to degradation, 

 to a loss, for instance, of the- nervous and muscular activi- 

 ties which make life most worth living. As already ex- 

 plained, it seems to us futile to look among animals for 

 any ethical conduct in the strict sense. 



