THE COMING OF SOCIALISM 97 



I that is, it is the spiritual aspect of a thing which makes 

 lit property. 



In the next place, property implies not only utility to 

 the owner, but the recognition of the ownership by the 

 society in which he lives. It is true that I must be able 

 to say of an object that it is mine, and mine as means of 

 possible personal ends ; but I must also be able to add 

 that it] is mine by right. And in order that I may say 

 this, society must be a partner in my act of appropriation. 

 The purely individual or isolated will cannot constitute 

 a right, for a right is an essentially social matter. To my 

 statement, "It is Mine," Society must add, "It is Thine, 

 and Thine by my enactment." 



An important principle lies here, which it will be well 

 to illustrate. When I say that a thing is mine by right, 

 I mean that my possession of it ought to be recognised 

 by others. My possession implies a social obligation on 

 my fellows. I consider that they must refrain of their 

 own accord from appropriating or injuring my property. 

 Their recognition of my ownership is not an act of grace 

 on their part, but a claim I have upon them. I consider 

 myself wronged if I must protect my property by force, 

 as if I were a robber. The most individualistic of private 

 owners, the most strenuous in asserting that he can do 

 as he likes with his own and that his property is the mere 

 instrument and creation of his own private will, is usually 

 the first to call upon the State to assert and make good 

 his rights. But he is not aware that, in doing so, he is 

 acknowledging that his property is an expression of the 

 social will ; that his ownership, whenever it becomes 

 a right, is due not alone nor primarily to his hav- 

 ing said Mine, but to the State having said Thine. 



