THE DEFENCE 209 



function of reason itself, except to make good this original 

 assumption ? " 



Of course the task of philosophy would be greatly light- 

 ened if we could either treat the unity of the world as a 

 fiction, or its differences as false show. Indeed, it would 

 have no task, and might retire on an old-age pension. That 

 method is precisely the one which idealists find their critics 

 follow. As to religion and morals, for instance, they would 

 either deny the reality of evil, or, making it absolute, deny 

 the immanence or perfection of God, hoping thereby either 

 to save morality at the expense of religion, or religion at 

 the expense of morality. "Is it not evident," the plain 

 man will say, " that God cannot be in every way perfect if 

 there is evil in the world, and that morality is impossible if 

 there be none ? " But Idealism is not content with easy 

 solution : it points to the facts of the case. It avers that 

 if we examine religion and morality, as actual phenomena 

 of man's experience, we shall find them to be compact of 

 these apparent incompatibilities. What is it that presents 

 itself in the life and convictions of the most devoutly re- 

 ligious man we happen to know? A trust in both the 

 goodness and the power of God which overflows all bounds, 

 an irrefragable optimism to which 



" The evil is null, is nought, is silence implying sound ; " 



and, side by side with that trust, a deep conviction of the 

 terrible reality of sin, and of the tragic earnestness of the 

 moral struggle. Let the religious life wane, and the con- 

 viction on both sides becomes more shallow : the goodness 

 of God is less certain, and sin a lighter affair. Let the 

 religious life deepen, and the trust in God becomes more 

 tranquil : i; ' Thou wilt keep him in perfect peace whose 



