TACONIC MOUNTAINS 



5677 



TACTICS 



pitals, the largest of which are the city and 

 county, Saint Joseph's and the Fanny Paddock 

 Memorial hospitals. A short distance south is 

 the Washington Hospital for the Insane. 



Extensive tracks of timber, coal mines, a fer- 

 tile adjacent agricultural territory, facilities for 

 manufacturing, and domestic and foreign trade 

 all contribute to the industrial importance of 

 Tacoma. It is a seaport whose ships trade with 

 coast cities, Europe and the Orient. A local esti- 

 mate for 1916 placed the value of foreign ex- 

 ports at $42,000,000 and the value of the total 

 ocean commerce at $75,000,000. Wheat, lum- 

 ber, coal, fish and fruit are the chief articles of 

 trade. The manufacture of lumber products is 

 by far the most important industry; the lum- 

 ber and woodworking plants produce an annual 

 output worth $10,000,000. Other important in- 

 dustrial plants are smelters, furniture factories, 

 flour and cereal mills and packing houses. 



Old Tacoma, founded in 1868, and New Ta- 

 coma, founded about 1869, were consolidated in 

 1883 to form Tacoma. In 1910 the commission 

 form of government was adopted. G.S. 



TACONIC, takon'ik, MOUNTAINS, a range 

 of low mountains uniting the Green Mountains 

 of Western Vermont with the Highlands of the 

 Hudson, and forming part of the boundary be- 

 tween New York and Massachusetts (see GREEN 

 MOUNTAINS). Equinox in Vermont (3,816 feet) 

 and Greylock in Massachusetts (3,538 feet) are 

 the highest peaks of the range. Like the other 

 mountains in this region, the Taconic are at- 

 tractive, green-covered hills with rounded sum- 

 mits. 



TACTICS, tak'tiks, the science and act of 

 arranging and maneuvering troops on the field 

 of battle. The object of strategy is to force 

 the enemy to battle under conditions disadvan- 

 tageous to him; the object of tactics is to win 

 the battle by the use of all arms infantry, cav- 

 alry and artillery. The duties and possibilities 

 of these three branches of an army are dissimi- 

 lar, but the result entirely depends on their 

 cooperation as a whole force. As a good me- 

 chanic must thoroughly understand the tools 

 he works with, and an engineer must know his 

 engine, so must a commander, to be a tactician, 

 know the limitations and possibilities of the arms 

 under his command. Lack of such knowledge 

 may lead to the putting of undue strain on cer- 

 tain parts of the army machine, or to letting 

 great strength run to waste in other parts. 



Infantry. Infantry is now, as it always has 

 been, the principal arm of the service, and the 

 tactical dispositions of all troops are in reality 



preliminaries to the final and decisive assault 

 by infantry which is the object of every com- 

 mander. Artillery of heavy type is used for 

 many hours to clear the way and to demoral- 

 ize the enemy. In attacking a position, infan- 

 try is usually marched in column (close order) 

 until almost within range of the enemy's artil- 

 lery fire, at about 3,500 or 4,000 yards, when the 

 order to deploy or "open out" is given. Under 

 the cover of its own artillery fire, sent over the 

 heads of the infantry, the troops continue to 

 advance, supports and reserves following. Tak- 

 ing advantage of every natural protection, the 

 advance develops into a series of rushes, be- 

 tween which the infantry men lie down and de- 

 liver a rapid and concentrated fire at the ene- 

 my's position. The artillery continues to shell 

 the position, with the object of assisting and 

 supporting the advance and subduing the ene- 

 my's fire. With modern magazine rifles the 

 result of such attacks is practically settled at a 

 distance of 800 or 900 yards. Either the posi- 

 tion is then taken by assault, or the attacking 

 forces are repulsed. 



Artillery. As already stated, artillery always 

 prepares the way for an attack, by incessant 

 bombardment. While the attack is proceeding, 

 the duties of the artillery are for one section 

 to shell the enemy's position as long as pos- 

 sible without endangering the advancing infan- 

 try, to watch carefully for counter attack and 

 to shell hostile infantry with the last ounce of 

 their strength, while another section, with a 

 series of rushes, follows up the attacking infan- 

 try, throwing aside the need for concealment, 

 and vigorously assisting the final assault. As a 

 general rule it may be laid down that attack- 

 ing infantry cannot succeed if their own artil- 

 lery has been disabled in the preliminary duel, 

 and the artillery could not achieve complete 

 success unless supported by the later infantry 

 attack. 



Cavalry. Until the War of the Nations it 

 had always been the object of the wise com- 

 mander to threaten or attack the enemy's flank, 

 and this involved the use of cavalry. Points 

 of vantage, such as hills, woods and villages, 

 would be seized and held to act as a screen to 

 the movements of outflanking troops behind 

 them. Flying machines made this secrecy im- 

 possible. At the beginning of the War of the 

 Nations it was believed that there would be 

 much work for cavalry units, but the system of 

 trench warfare which immediately developed 

 made useless that hitherto important military 

 arm, and opened the era of big guns. 



