WARRANTY AND REPRESENTATION. 4o 



good goer, and praise it to any extent with a vioAV of getting 

 it sold, but vague statements of this kind do not of them- 

 selves constitute a warranty, and a buyer may take or reject 

 these boastful recommendations according to his prudence.(a) 

 But when a statement is made, and on the faith of it a sale 

 is effected, which would not but for the faith in the state- 

 ment have been effected, it amounts to a warranty. (6) The 

 test in all cases where such words as " I warrant," or the 

 like, are not used, is whether the person who entered into 

 the bargain did so on the faith of the statements made, and 

 that this was known, or must have been known, to the party 

 making the representations. Thus A sold a horse to B. 

 He tried it, and thereafter asked A whether the horse was 

 steady and quiet to ride, and A said he was. The horse 

 turned out unsteady and B offered to return it, but A 

 declined and it was sold by judicial warrant. B raised an 

 action against A for repetition of the price. Lord Wood in 

 his judgment observed : — " On the evidence I think it clear 

 that a representation was made on which the purchaser was 

 entitled to rely and did rely — the representation so made, 

 according to the law of Scotland, amounting to a warranty. 

 Then I do not think that the trial at the time of sale took 

 off the effect of it, and threw it on the purchaser to satisfy 

 himself as to the qualities of the horse. For after the trial, 

 and while wTiting out the cheque he said, ' Are you sure the 

 horse is steady in harness, and quiet to ride ? ' and thus the 

 sale did not come to depend on the trial, but rested on the 

 representation." Lord Cowan also said : — " It is quite 

 enough that the purchaser says he wishes a horse for a 

 particular purpose, and that the seller says that the horse 

 will suit for that purpose. That is quite as good as the use 

 of express Avords of warrandice." (c) Thus, such Avords as 

 " You may depend on it the horse is perfectly quiet and free 



(«) B. Pr. 111. 



(h) Chandclor v. Lopus, cited in Smith's L.C. i. 186, see § 30. 



(c) Scott V. Steel, 1857, 20 D. 253, 257. 



