CHAPTER II 

 Classification 



COMTE classed the sciences as abstract and concrete, and 

 this subdivision is generally followed. Among the abstract 

 sciences Comte placed logic and mathematics, which treat 

 only of the form in which phenomena are known to us, 

 their relations in quantity and their sequence in thought, 

 and not of the phenomena themselves. All other natural 

 sciences he regarded as concrete. 



Herbert Spencer points out with justice that, while the 

 abstractness of the first group is indisputable, the sciences 

 of the second group are not wholly concrete, and he 

 removes mechanics, physics, chemistry, etc., into an 

 abstract-concrete group, because they lead the natural 

 philosopher to the purely abstract conception of force per se 

 apart from its manifestations in the various modes of motion 

 heat, light, electricity, etc. 



But this distinction is too philosophic, if we may use the 

 expression without offence, for scientific thought. Force, 

 apart from its manifestations, is only a conception, although 

 a necessary conception of the human mind. It has its start- 

 ing point in the mind, and expresses the attitude of the 

 mind towards the phenomena of which it takes cognizance. 

 If we try to conceive of force, except in its several exhibi- 

 tions, as modes of motion, we soon reach the vanishing 

 point in which the material of thought disappears, and 

 nothing remains but its clothing, the terms in which thought 

 is expressed. The horny-brained son of science acquires a 



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