18 PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT. 



region of the sensations alone nor that of the intellect 

 alone afforded any room for the aesthetic faculty — i.e., for 

 the appreciation or creation of the Beautiful. He had 

 thrown out the idea — though he had not maintained 

 the existence — of an intuitive intellect as opposed to 

 the discursive intellect with which human beings were 

 endowed. This idea was taken up by some of his followers 



ity. This certainly stood as a task 

 before the mind of Schiller even 

 before he became acquainted with 

 Kant's original treatment. His 

 knowledge and appreciation of 

 Kant's writings had been confined 

 to two tracts which Kant had 

 written in the ' Berlin Monthly ' on 

 " the problem of the origin and 

 historical development of the 

 human race" (1784-1786). These 

 had impressed him much, and con- 

 vinced him, as he wrote to Korner 

 (29th August 1787), that he would 

 be obliged to "read and perhaps 

 to study " Kant. The novelty in 

 Kant's treatment may be stated to 

 consist in the attempt to find in 

 the human mind the exact position 

 which the sensation, perception, and 

 recognition of the Beautiful occu- 

 pied as compared with the purely 

 intellectual faculties on the one 

 side and the moral on the other. 

 It was indeed a psychological prob- 

 lem, but one conceived under the 

 sway of the older faculty -psycho- 

 logy. The following extract taken 

 from Schasler's History referred to 

 above (p. 471 sqq.)^\\], I think, give 

 my readers the clearest and most 

 concise statement so far as it in- 

 terests us in this chapter. "Kant's 

 philosophy falls into the two divi- 

 sions of the theoretical and practical 

 philosophy — i.e., into the doctrine 

 of the subjectivity of knowledge 

 and the doctrine of liberty : the 

 former is treated in the ' Critique 

 of Pure Reason,' the latter in the 



' Critique of Practical Reason.' The 

 former, subjective knowledge, forms 

 the region of understanding, its aim 

 being Truth ; the latter, the sub- 

 jective will, with its aim in the 

 Good, is the province of reason. 

 Kant is the first who distinguished 

 these two, understanding and 

 reason, as separate faculties, a 

 distinction which has since, at 

 least in this sense, been superseded. 

 Between these two opposed facul- 

 ties Kant interposes a third, the 

 faculty of Judgment, in this wise 

 that on the one side it participates 

 in both, and on the other differs 

 from them. It has in common 

 with the understanding judgment ; 

 with the faculty of desire, pleasure 

 and displeasure ; but in order not 

 to identify them, Kant adds that 

 its judgment is without concep- 

 tions, for with these the understand- 

 ing alone is occupied, and its 

 pleasure is without interest, for 

 this belongs only to the faculty of 

 desire. Whilst understanding is 

 directed towards the True, and will- 

 ing towards the Good, the faculty of 

 judgment is directed to the Beauti- 

 ful, for this implies, on the one 

 side, a judgment, viz., that of 

 approval, but without a notion of 

 the essence of the thing ; and pro- 

 duces, on the other side, satis- 

 faction, but without a practical 

 interest in it. This recognition 

 of the Beautiful without definite 

 conceptions is what we call Taste." 



