OF THE BEAUTIFUL. 43 



archetypus is possible, but only that we, in contrast to 

 our own discursive intellect which requires images 

 (intellectus ectypus), . . . are led to the idea of an 

 intelUcUis archetypus, and that it contains no contra- 

 diction.' It appears, indeed, as if the author here 

 referred to a Divine intellect ; but if we are to elevate 

 ourselves in the moral region through the belief in 

 God, Virtue, and Immortality, into a higher sphere,-^ 

 the same might conceivably take place in the intel- 

 lectual region ; we might through the contemplation 

 [sight] of an ever-creating nature become worthy to 

 take an intellectual part in her creations. Had I not 

 indeed unconsciously and through a hidden impulse, 

 untiringly striven for the ground-form and the typical, 

 even though I had succeeded in building up a natural 

 exposition, nothing would now prevent me from courage- 

 ously facing what the old man of Konigsberg termed 

 ' the adventure of reason ' itself." 



This is exactly what Schelling attempted to do in 28. 

 philosophy. He placed himself, as it were, at the root caimeauing 

 or beo;inninff of things, and conceived of nature and "ngs 



" " o ' attempt. 



mind as emanating from the same source, from a state 

 of indifference or identity, forming the two sides of the 

 world-process — the unconscious and the conscious. His 

 earlier writings were accordingly concerned with tracing 

 the different stages of this twofold development, the 

 former in the philosophy of nature, the latter in the 

 philosophy of mind. At the end of this he points 

 out that what philosophy has done in detail and 

 in elaborating an intellectual intuition must at last 



^ As Kant pointed out in his ' Practical Philosophy.' 



