84 PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT. 



ground of everything ; how, nevertheless, both Fichte and 

 Schelling had pointed to the existence of an independent 

 (alogical) active principle which they identified with the 

 Will, and how, on the other side, Schopenhauer had 

 exaggerated the latter conception, placing an abstract or 

 general Will at the beginning of all, subordinating to it 

 the intellect as one only, but the highest, among the 

 manifestations or objectivations of the Will. Hartmann 

 also makes the pertinent remark that, inasmuch as 

 the idea or the intellect unfolds itself in the manifold 

 processes of thought, the idealist thinkers had a rich 

 field to work on, whereas the opposite movement of 

 thought had only one fact, that of the Will, and was 

 therefore not capable of any further development be- 

 yond the simple statement given to it by Schopenhauer, 

 in which it found both its beginning and its end. 

 ^ J'''\ . According to Hartmann, both movements of thought 



Contrast of '=' ' *= 



i^teCct contain a truth, but each contains only one side of the 

 fn^lfeun-^'^ truth. He adopts the formula of Schopenhauer, looks 

 upon the world both as Intellect and as Will, but to 

 him the two principles are co - ordinate : a higher 

 aspect must be gained, a principle must be established 

 which, as it were, unites the two ; this principle lies 

 higher or deeper than either the intellect or the will. 

 The underlying unity of both becomes divided or broken 

 in two in the region of consciousness. Accordingly the 

 union of the two separated principles, of the Intellect 

 and of the Will, must be sought in the region of the 

 unconscious ; it might be termed the absolute substance 

 with Spinoza, or the absolute mind with Hegel. But 

 inasmuch as the last term is usually meant to imply 



conscious. 



