106 



PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT. 



57. 

 His intro- 

 duction of 

 the term 

 Value. 



this view Herbart himself combined a distinct aversion 

 towards that endeavour so prominent among the ideaUsts 

 — the endeavour, viz., to see in works of art the expression 

 of something extraneous though higher, to reduce them 

 to symbols of something else. Much more important 

 than in the directions just mentioned is the influence 

 of Herbart in two other directions, although this is not 

 shown pre-eminently in his treatment of the sestheti- 

 cal problem. I mention it here because it offers a 

 convenient transition from the subject of this chapter 

 to that of the following. It has been stated that 

 Herbart's views are, to a large extent, foreshadowed in 

 those of Kant. Nevertheless he introduced certain 

 modifications in the expression of these views which 

 have become important. Kant had introduced the idea 

 of purpose in order to explain the Beautiful, which, as 

 he put it, appears to us purposeful without having a 

 definite end or purpose extraneous to itself. It had, in 

 fact, its purpose within itself. This correct idea received 

 a more adequate expression when Herbart put in the 

 place of the term purpose or end the term value or 

 worth. In doing so he emphasised the truth already 

 expressed by Kant, that in pronouncing testhetical judg- 

 ments we do not reflect upon the usefulness of the thing 

 we judge, but recognise its end or purpose to lie in itself. 

 At the same time, this way of putting the matter points 

 to the subjective side of iesthetical judgments, inasmuch 

 as we can only speak of the value or worth of anything 

 if we personally realise or experience the same. It also 

 allows us to bring together oesthetical and ethical judg- 



