OF THE GOOD. 147 



possess, in a low and uncivilised state, that which 

 neither science nor knowledge can supply." 



Thus we find in Kant's Ethics what we found already 

 in his theoretical philosophy or Metaphysics, the 

 conception of two kinds of reality, the phenomenal, 

 practical, or everyday reality which surrounds us, and 

 a higher reality which lies above or behind the other. 

 In his theoretical philosophy he had suggested already 

 that this higher reality, which he there termed the 

 Thing in itself or the Noumenon, was known to us only 

 in the single instance of our own will, and he had based 

 upon this idea his conception of the Freedom of the 

 Will, or as he termed it, of the intelligible, as opposed 

 to the phenomenal, character of the human self. 

 Accordingly, what in everyday life appeared to be most 

 real, the things that surround us and the actions of men, 

 would, from this higher metaphysical, ethical, or religious 

 point of view, appear as comparatively unimportant and 

 unreal; over and above it we find, within our own 

 consciousness, a higher and more important reality. 

 This view, he maintained, coincides with the general 

 verdict of common-sense, which, under the names of 

 conscience, moral sense, feeling of duty and obligation, 

 moral and religious sanction, refers all human action to 

 a higher standard, placing it under the dictates of a 

 supreme law. This is usually expressed in the term : 

 the autonomy of the human Will, its self-restrained or 

 self-regulated freedom : the Good Will in fact is and 

 has its own law. 



The same dualism which in Kant's philosophy appears 

 as two different worlds, as two realities, found, as we 



