OF THE GOOD. 



169 



was not popular at the time when the controversy arose 

 as to the drift of Fichte's speculation. Moral philosophy 

 had not then descended to the level of utilitarianism 

 and naturalism. In abandoning to a large extent the 

 formalities of the reigning orthodox belief, the enlightened 

 thought of the age did not tend towards irreligion. It 

 was rather deeply religious and spiritual, it did not aim 

 at destroying the intimate connection of religion and 

 morality, it regarded religion as the necessary metaphysic 

 of ethics. Thus Fichte declared that : " From the be- 

 ginning of the world down to the present day, religion, 

 whatever form it may have assumed, has been essentially 

 metaphysic : and he who despises and derides metaphysic 

 — i.e., everything a priori — either knows not what lie 

 does or else he despises and derides religion." ^ 



man to his own independence, and 

 has made the self-assurauce of his 

 own reasoning self the corner-stone 

 of all his convictions, affording, at 

 the same time, the view of a 

 mysterious connection which values 

 the individual with all the highest 

 and best that it may succeed in 

 only as a member in a series, only 

 as an instrument in the develop- 

 ment of an infinite life. The realm 

 of reason and of moral autonomy is 

 at the same time a kingdom of 

 grace : herein Fichte's system mir- 

 rors the twin aspects of all moral 

 experience, the last word of all the 

 deepest thought on the ground of 

 the world-process, and it does so 

 more truly than any other sj-stem. 

 We feel ourselves free and at the 

 same time bound, we may and must 

 trust our own power, and must, if 

 we desire to be honest, regard with 

 wonder as a mysterious gift this 

 power itself which leads us towards 

 success ; we know that whatever 

 exists in the way of reason, clarity, 



goodness, and beauty on this eaith 

 is our work and cannot be any one 

 else's, and should still not know how 

 to create reason and beauty were 

 it not that something in our nature 

 which we have not given to our- 

 selves lends us its wizard's mantle. 

 It is possible to understand man- 

 kind and its historical labour per- 

 fectly, as Positivism does, without 

 having always in view that mys- 

 terious connection which joins it to 

 the deepest root of reality ; but 

 something remains unexpressed in 

 the background which no inclusive 

 world-formula can well do without. 

 Nothing can happen in this world 

 that is not prepared and grounded 

 in its innermost essence : and a 

 world in which a realm of conscious 

 reason is possible must count 

 amongst its ultimate constituents 

 reason itself." (F. Jodl, ' Geschichte 

 der Ethik,' vol. ii., 1889, pp. 87 

 sqq.). 



'■ Fichte, ' Werke,' vol. vii. p. 

 241. 



