OF THE GOOD. 185 



in the explanation of Evil and Sin ; the same also as 

 that adopted by the modern theories of Evolution when 

 dealing with the problem of Life. A prolonged study, a 

 deeper comprehension has, in every case, shown that the 

 problem was not solved, but only for a time moved away 

 from the centre of the field of reflection ; the pressure 

 was relieved, but this relief has proved to be only 

 temporary. 



These remarks will lead us to understand easily the 34. 

 characteristic and original features of Comte's philosophy, positive 

 of the positive view as distinguished from the meta- ^j.^s^"'^^®'^ 

 physical view of German Idealism, but also as distin- mtta'physics 

 guished from the psychological view peculiar to English psychofogy! 

 thought. We can at once recognise that it is diametri- 

 cally opposed to the former ; but that, though different, 

 it is not opposed, but complementary to the latter. And 

 so it has also proved to be historically ; in as much as 

 it was first adequately understood in England where an 

 amalgamation of the older psychology with Comtian 

 ideas and the more recent theory of descent have led to 

 the modern doctrine of Evolution. On the contrary, in 

 Germany Comte got no hearing till long after the 

 classical era of Idealism, and then only through the 

 writings of English thinkers, notably of John Stuart 

 Mill. This happened just at the time when, under the 

 influence of Kant's and Hegel's writings, a counter- 

 movement arose in England in opposition to Positivism 

 in its various forms such as Utilitarianism, Naturalism, 

 and Agnosticism. 



Considering now more closely the contribution of 

 Comte's philosophy to the definition and the solution of 



